Shifting California Law toward a Recognition that Injured Animals Are Not “Replaceable” Forms of Property

On October 23, the Second District for the California Court of Appeals issued an important decision stating that when a dog, cat or other companion animal is negligently or intentionally injured, the animal’s legal owner may be compensated for the reasonable and necessary veterinary costs incurred for the treatment and care of the animal. In so doing, the three judge panel unanimously rejected the argument that such a recovery is limited to the “market value” of the injured animal, the rule generally applicable to cases involving damage to other forms of property.

The decision came in two cases that presented the same issue and were consolidated on appeal. In Martinez v. Robledo, the plaintiff alleged that his two-year-old German Shepherd named Gunner was shot by a neighbor in connection with a dispute. As a result, one of Gunner’s legs was amputated, and the plaintiff incurred over $20,000 in veterinarian bills. In Workman v. Klause, the plaintiff alleged that a veterinarian negligently operated on the plaintiff’s nine-year-old Golden Retriever named Katie. After the surgery, Katie began vomiting blood and exhibited signs of pain and internal bleeding, and the plaintiff brought her to another animal hospital for emergency surgery. The surgery was successful, but plaintiff was billed $37,766.06.

In each case, the trial court ruled just before trial that the measure of damages would be limited to the “market value” of the dog, which would be little or nothing. Had the trial courts’ rulings held, even if the plaintiffs could show that such veterinary costs were caused by a wrongful shooting (in Gunner’s case) or a botched operation (in Katie’s case), the plaintiffs would not have been entitled to recover the substantial veterinary costs required to save the lives of the injured dogs.

After the plaintiffs sought appellate review in the Second District Court of Appeal, ALDF (represented by ALDF Senior Attorney, Matthew Liebman and myself) filed amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) briefs in support of the plaintiffs. In explaining why injured animals should not be treated the same way as a damaged table or car, the ALDF highlighted how other areas of law treat animals in unique ways–for instance, by holding animal owners criminally liable for mistreating or neglecting animals. ALDF also surveyed decisions from other states to show that recovery of veterinary bills has been permitted in Florida, Illinois, New York and Kansas. Based on the extensive precedent in California and throughout the country for recognizing animals as living, sentient beings, ALDF argued that the recovery of necessary medical costs necessitated by the tortious injury to the animal should not be curtailed by application of a rule applicable to inanimate objects that can be replaced.

The Court of Appeals agreed, and ruled for the plaintiffs. In so doing, the Court held that “the determination of a pet’s value cannot be made by solely looking to the marketplace.” This is because “while people typically place substantial value on their own animal companions, as evidenced by the large sums of money spent on food, medical care, toys, boarding and grooming, etc., there is generally no market for other people’s pets.” The Court also cited a collection of animal cruelty laws from around the country available on ALDF’s website and concluded that “the law already treats animals differently from other forms of personal property.” Indeed, the Court stated that this special distinction between animals and other forms of property is longstanding. “In California, the Legislature has recognized since 1872 that animals are special, sentient beings, because unlike other forms of property, animals feel pain, suffer and die.”

Together with a similar decision issued by the First District last year, Kimes v. Grosser, the Second District’s decision solidifies the shift in California law away from an anachronistic treatment of injured animals as mere property, and toward a recognition that animals are living beings whose true value is not dependant on the marketplace. These two cases now will go back to the trial courts for trial, and the plaintiffs will be able to introduce evidence of the substantial amounts they incurred to save the lives of their dogs.

This guest blog was written by David Zaft, Caldwell Leslie & Proctor, who served as co-counsel for ALDF, amicus curiae in the Martinez and Workman appeals.